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COMMENTS 
REGULATORY OPTIONS FOR SURROGATE 
ARRANGEMENTS IN MARYLAND 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The New Jersey litigation popularly known as the Baby M case1 
focused national attention on surrogate parenting contracts. Surrogate 
arrangements are not a new phenomenon-they have existed since bibli-
cal times.2 As the Baby M case made clear, however, surrogate arrange-
ments can be a source of confusion and suffering for the participants as 
well as for the child. Since Baby M was decided, a number of states have 
enacted legislation or considered proposals to regulate surrogate arrange-
ments. For legislators as well as for the general public, the New Jersey 
decision is a significant source of insight into the moral, ethical and legal 
issues raised by surrogate arrangements. 
This comment begins by briefly reviewing the problem of infertility 
and the measures available to infertile couples for obtaining a child, in-
cluding surrogate arrangements. Next, it surveys the factual context and 
outcome of the Baby M case and considers the public policy issues raised 
by surrogate arrangements. Finally, it examines the obstacles which ex-
isting law places in the way of enforcement of surrogate arrangements in 
Maryland and the legislative options available to the Maryland General 
Assembly for addressing the problem. 
II. THE INFERTILITY PROBLEM 
One out of every six American couples has an infertility problem. 3 
Reasons for infertility abound. For example, a man or woman of any age 
may have a physiological impediment to reproductivity, owing to a ge-
netic defect, an illness, or an accident. In addition, a fertile couple may 
l. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 
and remanded, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
2. Numerous commentators have noted the possibility that the first surrogate mother 
was Hagar: · 
l.Now Sarai Abram's wife bare him no children: and she had an 
handmaid, an Egyptian, whose name was Hagar. 
2.And Sarai said unto Abram, Behold now, the LORD hath restrained 
me from bearing; I pray thee, go in unto my maid; it may be that I may 
obtain children by her. And Abram hearkened to the voice of Sarai. 
Genesis 16:1-2. 
3. "Infertility" describes a "presumably normal patient who is unable to conceive dur-
ing a specific period of time, usually one year." Moghissi & Evans, Infertility, in 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 927 (5th ed. 1986). "Sterile," describes a "woman 
who can never become pregnant because of a congenital anomaly, disease, or opera-
tion." /d. In the Baby M case, the court noted that various definitions of infertility 
exist, including "(1) an inability to conceive, (2) unprotected coitus for a period in 
excess of one year without conception, (3) ... the inability to conceive, carry or bear 
a child without significant risk to either the mother or the fetus." Baby M, 217 N.J. 
Super. at 379-80, 525 A.2d at 1161. 
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choose not to have a baby naturally for fear of passing on to the child a 
genetic defect, such as hemophilia,4 or because the mother's age or condi-
tion of health puts her at unusually high risk in a pregnancy.5 Some 
authorities have suggested that the term "infertility" should be defined to 
include not only physical impedimenfs to fertility but also social ones, 
such as nutritional deficiencies which prevent conception or carrying a 
child to term, and that it should also be extended to include women 
whose children do not live through infancy.6 
Although there are various solutions to the problem of infertility, 
none of them is fully satisfactory. Adoption, the traditional method by 
which infertile couples acquire a child, has become a long and arduous 
process. The waiting period to adopt an infant can range from three to 
eight years. 7 In some cases, a couple has specific requirements for the 
age, physical characteristics, health, and religious background of the 
child.8 Additionally, adoption agencies may require potential parents to 
meet certain criteria as to age, length of marriage, or proof of infertility. 9 
When these requirements combine with the shortage of desirable 
adoptees and the increasing number of couples seeking to adopt, the 
waiting period may become so protracted that adoption ceases to be a 
viable solution. 10 
Advanced reproductive technologies provide some infertile couples 
with the ability to have children who are biologically related to one or 
4. L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST IN-
FERTILITY TREATMENTS INCLUDING In Vitro Fertilization, Artificial Insemination, 
and Surrogate Motherhood 7 (1984). 
5. /d. at 7, 198; Note, Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 323, 
324 & n.lO (1981) [hereinafter Note, Surrogate Mothers]. 
6. Reproductive Technologies: Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Children, Youth 
and Families, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (testimony of Lori B. Andrews, Re-
search Fellow, American Bar Foundation) (unpublished document) [hereinafter 
Testimony]. The significant increase in infertility which has occurred recently is 
traceable to three causes: (1) women have delayed childbearing until well into their 
thirties, and fertility decreases with age; (2) some methods of birth control, such as 
IUDs, the Pill, and abortion, carry a risk of infertility, particularly when an infec-
tion occurs during use of the method; and (3) the incidence of sexually transmitted 
diseases, which can cause infertility, has increased. Capron, Alternative Birth Tech-
nologies: Legal Challenges, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 683 (1987). 
7. BAKER, BABY SELLING: THE SCANDAL OF BLACK MARKET ADOPTION 1 (1978); 
Desperately Seeking Baby, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Oct. 5, 1987, at 59. 
8. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD 23 (1973); Note, Surrogate Mothers, supra note 5, at 324. What constitutes a 
desirable infant depends upon the requirements of the adopting couple. Adoptees 
most frequently sought are healthy white infants, and the demand for them exceeds 
the supply. W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. M. Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGEN-
CIES: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 9 (1978) [hereinafter MEEZAN). 
9. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoption, 67 B.U.L. REV. 59, 61 (1987). 
10. The reduction in supply of adoptees is largely attributable to three factors: (1) the 
widespread use of contraceptives; (2) the legalization of abortion; and (3) society's 
acceptance of unwed mothers. See MEEZAN, supra note 8, at 9; see also BAKER, 
supra note 7, at I; Desperately Seeking Baby, supra note 7, at 59. 
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both parents. 11 The best known of these technologies is artificial insemi-
nation, which has existed for many years as an acceptable alternative 
means of reproduction. 12 Artificial insemination involves the injection of 
the donor's semen into the woman's reproductive tract in order to fertil-
ize her ovum. 13 This method is often successful in overcoming both male 
and female infertility problems. 14 
When infertility is caused by an obstruction of the woman's fallo-
pian tubes or by the man's low sperm count artificial insemination may 
not succeed and in vitro fertilization may be attempted. 15 In in vitro fer-
tilization, an egg is surgically removed from a woman's ovary and placed 
in a petri dish containing both a special medium and sperm from the 
husband or an anonymous donor. If fertilization occurs, the embryo is 
implanted into the woman's uterus and the woman carries the child to 
term. 16 
Generally, artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization are desira-
ble because the child who is conceived is genetically related to at least 
one of the parents. Yet a large number of women and childless couples 
are either sterile or are unable to carry a child to term, and thus artificial 
insemination and in vitro fertilization are unavailable as a means of re-
11. For a detailed discussion of alternative reproductive technologies, including embryo 
transfer, see Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 
VA. L. REV. 465, 495 (1983). 
12. Successful artificial insemination of humans was first documented in 1790 in Eng-
land. See Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331, 331 
(1980). More than 20,000 children are conceived annually by artificial insemina-
tion, and many states have artificial insemination statutes which regulate the prac-
tice. Andrews, The Stork Market: the Law of the New Reproductive Technologies, 70 
A.B.A.J. 50, 50 (1984). 
13. See Sagall, Artificial Insemination, TRIAL, Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 59; Comment, Artifi-
cial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of Unresolved Ques-
tions, 17 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 913, 914 (1981). 
14. Capron, supra note 6, at 681. There are two basic types of artificial insemination: 
artificial insemination donor (AID) and artificial insemination homologous (AIH). 
AID is utilized when the husband is sterile, has a low sperm count, or carries ge-
netic defects. Sperm are donated by a third party whose identity is unknown to the 
participating couple. In AIH, the husband's sperm is used to impregnate the wife. 
AIH is appropriate when the husband is impotent or has a low sperm count, or 
when the wife's reproductive system inhibits conception through normal inter-
course. The child born by AIH is biologically related to both the husband and the 
wife, while the one born by AID is biologically related to the wife only. Sagall, 
supra note 13, at 59-62. For a thorough discussion of AID and AIH, see Lorio, 
Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REV. 
1641, 1643-52 (1984). 
15. Popularly known as the "test tube baby" technique, the first successful in vitro fertil-
ization occurred in 1978 in England. For a thorough discussion of in vitro fertiliza-
tion, .including legal considerations, see Lorio, supra note 14, at 1665-72. See also 
Andrews, supra note 12, at 50; Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo 
Transfer: MedicoLegal Aspects of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. 
L.Q. 199 (1983). 
16. Singer, Technology and Procreating: How Far Should We Go ?, TECH. REV., Feb.-
Mar. 1985, at 22. 
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productionP When adoption is also not a viable option, surrogate ar-
rangements may be the only means available for infertile couples to 
obtain a child. 
Typically, a surrogate arrangement involves a woman who, for a fee 
or the payment of certain expenses, agrees to be impregnated by artificial 
insemination and to surrender the child at birth to the natural father and 
his wife. 18 The reasons why women consent to serve as surrogates are 
varied and complex. 19 Some women are motivated by friendship, or by 
the wish to perform an altruistic deed and enable other couples to have 
the joy of childrearing. 20 Others may want to experience pregnancy and 
childbirth without the responsibility of raising the child.21 Few women, 
however, act as surrogate mothers without receiving compensation.22 It 
is likely that if women were prohibited from receiving meaningful com-
pensation for their services, very few would volunteer to serve as 
surrogates. 23 
Ordinarily, the surrogate mother is the genetic and gestation mother 
of the child.24 Some professionals who arrange surrogate births prefer 
the surrogate to be single, in order to obviate a presumption that a mar-
ried woman's husband is the natural father of the surrogate's child. 25 
Others prefer that the surrogate be married, with children of her own, on 
the premise that she will be more aware of the medical and emotional 
aspects of pregnancy than a woman without children and, consequently, 
less likely to attempt to keep the child after its birth.26 
17. N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 15 (1981). 
18. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147, 147 (1980) 
[hereinafter Legal Problems]. Noel Keane was director of the surrogate agency in-
volved in the Baby M case. 
19. See generally Note, Surrogate Parenthood-An Analysis of the Problems and a Solu-
tion: Representation for the Child, 12 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 143, 147-48 (1986) 
[hereinafter Note, Representation for the Chile!]. 
20. Taub, Amicus Brief: In the Matter of Baby M, 10 Women's Rts. L. Rep. (Rutgers 
Univ.) 7, 23 (1987); A Surrogate's Story, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 53. See generally 
N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 17, at 229-30. Additionally, some women may 
become surrogates in order to alleviate feelings of guilt about a past abortion. 
21. N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 17, at 215-16. 
22. The standard compensation for surrogate arrangements is $10,000 plus expenses. 
The total cost to an infertile couple usually will range from $20,000 to $30,000. See 
Lorio, supra note 14, at 1658. Advertisements have appeared which offer surrogate 
mothers significantly higher fees. See Annas, Making Babies Without Sex: The Law 
and the Profits, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1415, 1416 (1984). 
23. Legal Problems, supra note 18, at 153. · 
24. Exceptions exist which are not addressed in this article. For example, the gestation 
mother may bear no genetic relationship to the child. In such a case, an egg is 
fertilized in vitro and then implanted in the uterus of the surrogate mother who 
agrees, for a fee, to carry the fetus to term and surrender the child to the contracting 
parents. See Note, The Rights of the Biological Father: From Adoption and Custody 
to Surrogate Motherhood, 12 VT. L. REV. 87, 88 n.11 (1987). 
25. SeeN. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 17, at 49, 287. 
26. See infra notes 192, 206 and accompanying text; see also Graham, Surrogate Gesta-
tion and the Protection of Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 291, 293 n.7 (1982). 
But see In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), a.lf'd in part, 
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The parties to surrogate arrangements generally record their agree-
ment in a signed contract. Usually, the biological father contracts with 
the surrogate mother and also with her husband, if she is married. In 
some contracts, the natural father's wife is also a party to the agreement. 
Because many contingencies need to be addressed, most contracts are 
lengthy and detailed. 27 
Once the contract is signed, conception is attempted. For a period 
of time prior to and following artificial insemination, the surrogate 
mother must abstain from sexual intercourse to ensure that any child 
conceived was fathered by the semen donor. 28 After conception occurs, 
the surrogate's remaining responsibilities are to carry the child to term, 
give birth, and then turn the child over to the natural father and his wife 
so that the wife can adopt the child.29 Generally, this means that the 
surrogate mother must agree to surrender all parental rights to, and be 
permanently separated from, the child. It was the latter requirement 
which ultimately led to the breakdown of the surrogacy arrangement be-
tween the contracting parties in the Baby M case. 
III. IN RE BABY M 
A. The Background to the Litigation 
William and Elizabeth Stern, the plaintiffs in the Baby M case, de-
cided to try to obtain a child through a surrogate arrangement after 
learning that Mrs. Stern might have multiple sclerosis, a condition that 
may cause blindness or paraplegia in pregnant women. 30 Initially the 
Sterns considered adoption, but they anticipated difficulties in adopting 
because of their age and different religious backgrounds. 31 
Mary Beth Whitehead, the defendant, was motivated to enter into a 
surrogate arrangement both by her desire to give a couple who could 
have no children "the gift of life," and by the need for money.32 Both she 
and the Sterns responded to advertising by a New York infertility clinic. 
rev'd in part and remanded, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (surrogate had two 
children of her own but nevertheless changed her mind and sought to keep the 
infant). 
27. For examples of surrogate contracts, seeN. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 17, at 
290-96. 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 93-95; see also Note, Developing a Concept of the 
Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 13 GEO. L.J. 
1283, 1285 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Developing a Concept]. 
29. See Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. 
PROBS. 1, 2 ( 1986). The natural father does not need to adopt. See infra notes 103-
116, 134-140 and accompanying text. 
30. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 413, 537 A.2d at 1235. 
31. /d. at 413, 537 A.2d at 1236. Mr. Stern also favored a surrogate arrangement over 
adoption because most of his family died in the Holocaust and he was anxious to 
have a child to whom he was genetically related. /d. at 413, 537 A.2d at 1235. 
32. /d. at 413, 537 A.2d at 1236. In November, 1987, Mary Beth Whitehead divorced 
her husband Richard and remarried Dean Gould. In articles and proceedings sub-
sequent to that date she is sometimes referred to as Mary Beth Whitehead-Gould. 
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In February 1985, after Mr. Stem and Mrs. Whitehead had met and ne-
gotiated the terms, they entered into a typical surrogacy contract. 33 The 
agreement provided that Mrs. Whitehead would be artificially insemi-
nated with Mr. Stem's sperm, and that if conception occurred she would 
carry the child to term, give birth and surrender the child to the Stems. 
In addition, Mrs. Whitehead was required to terminate her maternal 
rights so that Mrs. Stem could adopt the child. 34 Mrs. Stem was not a 
party to the agreement, but the contract gave her sole custody of the 
child in the event of Mr. Stem's death. Mr. Stem was to pay Mrs. 
Whitehead $10,000 when she surrendered the child to him. He also 
agreed to pay the unreimbursed medical expenses incurred as a result of 
the pregnancy unless subsequent blood tests proved that the child was 
not his own. 35 
Baby M was born on March 27, 1986. Although Mrs. Whitehead 
surrendered the baby to the Stems on March 30, the next day she re-
quested permission to take the child for a brief time. 36 Alarmed by Mrs. 
Whitehead's distraught condition and references to suicide, the Stems 
permitted her to take the baby.37 When, after repeated requests, Mrs. 
Whitehead refused to relinquish Baby M, Mr. Stem filed a complaint in 
New Jersey Superior Court seeking enforcement of the surrogacy 
contract. 38 
In an ex parte order, the court awarded temporary custody of Baby 
M to the Stems. 39 After the baby was recovered and turned over to the 
Stems, the temporary order was reaffirmed by the trial court. The Stems 
retained temporary custody, and Mrs. Whitehead was awarded limited 
visitation with Baby M pending final judgment.40 The Stems' complaint 
sought possession and ultimate custody of the child on the basis of en-
forcement of the surrogacy contract, and requested further that Mrs. 
33. See id. at 470-75, 537 A.2d at 1265-70; see also supra note 27. 
34. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 412, 537 A.2d at 1235. 
35. /d. If Mrs. Whitehead miscarried prior to the fifth month, she was to receive com-
pensation for medical expenses but no fee. If she miscarried after the fourth month 
or if the baby was stillborn, she was to receive medical expenses plus a fee of $1,000. 
Mrs. Whitehead also agreed not to abort the fetus unless the inseminating physician 
found that it was necessary to do so to protect her health or that the child was likely 
to be abnormal. If an abnormality was found, Mr. Stem had the right to require 
that Ms. Whitehead have an abortion, whereupon she would receive a fee of $1,000 
plus medical expenses. /d. at 471-73, 537 A.2d at 1266-68. 
36. /d. at 414-15, 537 A.2d at 1236-37. 
37. /d. at 415, 537 A.2d at 1236-37. 
38. /d. at 415-16, 537 A.2d at 1237. 
39. After the ex parte order was entered, a process server, accompanied by the Stems 
and the local police, entered the Whitehead home to execute the order. During a 
period of confusion, the baby was handed out a window to Mr. Whitehead, who was 
waiting outside. Subsequently, the Whiteheads escaped to Florida and spent three 
months in hiding living at approximately twenty different locations. Eventually, 
Mrs. Whitehead was located and the child was brought back to New Jersey. Id. at 
416, 537 A.2d at 1237. 
40. Taub, supra note 20, at 9. Ms. Whitehead was allowed biweekly visits with the 
child, supervised by the guardian ad litem, at a state youth home. /d. at 9 n.IO. 
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Whitehead's parental rights be terminated and that Mrs. Stem be al-
lowed to adopt the child. After a lengthy trial, the Stems were granted 
the relief they sought. 41 In April 1987, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on Mrs. Whitehead's appeal.42 
B. The Baby M Decision 
The decision rendered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Febru-
ary 1988 was the first ruling by a state appellate court which directly 
addressed the enforceability of a surrogate parenting contract. The court 
held. that the contract was invalid,43 that termination of parental rights 
could not be based upon such a contract,44 and that Mrs. Whitehead 
retained her rights as legal mother of the baby.45 Additionally, the court 
rejected the constitutional arguments advanced by both parties. 46 The 
court concluded, however, that it was in the best interest of Baby M to 
award custody to Mr. Stem.47 
1. The Invalidity of the Surrogate Contract 
According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Baby M surrogate 
contract was invalid because it conflicted with statutory provisions and 
violated established public policy. Specifically, the court held that the 
contract violated New Jersey statutes which: (1) prohibited the use of 
money in connection with adoptions; (2) required proof of parental un-
fitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights; (3) limited 
termination of parental rights to situations where there had been a 
proper surrender of the child to an appropriate agency; and (4) allowed 
revocation of consent tq custody in private placement adoptions.48 The 
court found that established New Jersey public policy was undermined 
because: (1) the contractdetermined custody rights before the child was 
born, thus contravening the requirement that custody be awarded in ac-
41. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 
and remanded, 109 N:J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). The trial court concluded that 
the surrogate parenting agreement was a valid contract that should be specifically 
enforced by requiring that the surrogate relinquish control over the child to the 
father and terminate her parental rights. /d. at 398-99, 408, 525 A.2d at 1170-71, 
1175. In upholding the contract, the court decided that the New Jersey adoption 
statutes did not apply to surrogacy, and that surrogacy did not violate the state's 
public policy. /d. at 372-75, 525 A.2d at 1157-59. The court noted, however, that 
"whether there will be specific performance of this surrogacy contract depends on 
whether doing so is in the child's best interests." ld. at 390, 525 A.2d at 1166. 
42. In re Baby M, 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (1987). 
43. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 421-22, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (1988). 
44. Id. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240. 
45. Id. at 444-47, 537 A.2d at 1251-53. 
46. /d. at 447-52, 537 A.2d at 1253-55. 
47. ld. at 459, 537 A.2d at 1259. 
48. Id. at 423-34, 537 A.2d at 1240-46. In deciding that the surrogate contract violated 
these statutes, the court also implicitly rejected the trial court's conclusion that ex-
isting adoption and termination statutes were not controlling because the state legis-
lature did not have surrogacy in mind when it passed those statutes. 
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cordance with the child's best interest; (2) the contract guaranteed per-
manent separation of the child from one of its natural parents; (3) the 
contract gave the father greater rights than the mother, violating the pol-
icy that the rights of the natural parents are equal regarding the child; 
(4) the contract made informed consent impossible by failing to provide 
that the natural mother was to receive independent legal advice and 
counseling before surrendering her child; and (5) the contractual provi-
sion for the payment of money in connection with an adoption was con-
ducive to the exploitation of women in need of money, advancement of 
the middleman's profit motive, and the sale of a child.49 
2. Termination of Parental Rights 
If Mrs. Whitehead's rights as Baby M's parent were terminated, she 
would no longer have a claim to rights of custody or visitation, and adop-
tion by Mrs. Stern could proceed. 50 If the court did not terminate her 
parental rights, however, she would retain visitation rights as the legal 
mother even if she were denied custody of the child.51 
The court determined that termination of Mrs. Whitehead's paren-
tal rights could not be based on the contract because the contract was 
illegal and unenforceable.52 The court also found no statutory basis for 
termination based on the facts in the case. There was no intentional 
abandonment of the child on the part of Mrs. Whitehead, nor was she 
alleged to be an unfit mother. 53 Lacking any contractual or statutory 
standard on which to base termination of parental rights, the court held 
that Mrs. Whitehead was entitled to retain her legal status as mother of 
the child. 54 
3. Constitutional Issues 
Several constitutional arguments were advanced by the parties, none 
of which succeeded. 55 The court dismissed Mr. Stern's claim to custody 
based upon the right of procreation, finding that "the custody, care, com-
panionship, and nurturing that follow birth are not parts of the right to 
procreation."56 Consequently, the court found that Mr. Stern had no 
greater fundamental right to custody of his child than the rights of the 
child's mother. The court also rejected Mr. Stern's claim that he was 
denied equal protection of New Jersey law, noting that a sperm donor 
49. Jd. at 434-44, 537 A.2d at 1246-50. 
50. Jd. at 444, 537 A.2d at 1251. 
51. ld.; see also Wilke v. Cu1p, 196 N.J. Super. 487, 496, 483 A.2d 420, 424 (App. Div. 
1984), cert. denied, 989 N.J. 243, 491 A.2d 728 (1985). 
52. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 429, 537 A.2d 1243-44; see also supra text accompanying notes 
48-49. 
53. Jd. at 445, 537 A.2d at 1252. 
54. ld. at 447, 537 A.2d at 1253. 
55. ld. at 447-48, 537 A.2d at 1253. 
56. ld. at 448, 537 A.2d at 1253-54. 
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cannot be equated with a surrogate mother. 57 Finally, in view of its deci-
sion that the contract was invalid, the court declined to rule on Mrs. 
Whitehead's constitutional claim that the companionship of her child 
was a fundamental right. 58 
4. Custody 
Because the legal framework of the custody issue resembled that of a 
custody dispute between two natural parents when each is married to 
another spouse, the court relied upon New Jersey custody law to resolve 
the dispute. 59 The supreme court agreed with the trial court that the 
critical issue was the best interests of the child and that the Stems should 
be awarded custody.60 It also cautioned that only in extreme cases 
should the child be taken from the mother prior to resolution of the dis-
pute. 61 Despite this comment, however, the court rejected Mrs. White-
head's suggestion that she be granted custody in order to discourage 
future surrogate arrangements.62 As the court observed, a declaration 
that surrogate contracts are unenforceable and illegal is sufficient to deter 
future arrangements. There was no need to "sacrifice the child's interests 
in order to make the point sharper."63 Thus, the Stems were ultimately 
awarded custody. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES REGARDING SURROGATE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Surrogate parenting arrangements have existed in different forms for 
many years, and most of them have gone uncontested. 64 Prior to the · 
Baby M case, no appellate court in the United States had decided the 
validity of a surrogate parenting contract. 65 Thus, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's decision to invalidate the Baby M surrogacy contract 
57. ld. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1254-55. 
58. ld. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1255. 
59. ld. at 453, 537 A.2d at 1256. 
60. Id. at 459, 537 A.2d at 1259. 
61. ld. at 462, 537 A.2d at 1261. 
62. ld. at 454, 537 A.2d at 1257. 
63. Id. at 454-55, 537 A.2d at 1257. 
64. Prior to the Baby M case, several other surrogate mothers had changed their minds 
and refused to relinquish custody of the child after birth. In three of the cases, the 
contracting couples decided not to seek enforcement of the contract. In one case, 
however, the surrogate mother, who had changed her mind several weeks after ter-
minating her parental rights in an adoption proceeding, lost her custody battle. Ga-
len, Surrogate Law, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 10, cols. 2-3. 
65. Although other state appellate courts have heard disputes arising out of surrogate 
arrangements, they have not decided them on grounds of the validity of the con-
tract. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 
1986) (whether surrogate parenting constitutes baby selling is for the legislature to 
determine); Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1981), 
cert. denied, 414 Mich. 875 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983) (adoption 
statute prohibits couple from paying consideration in conjunction with use of state's 
adoption procedures); Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. 83-001 (1983) (unless operating with 
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broke new legal ground. The court's decision is consistent with well-
established public policy that rejects practices which make the creation 
of a human being the subject of a contract. 66 An examination of the 
public policy arguments which tend to support, or, conversely, to dis-
courage surrogate arrangements is therefore useful in evaluating legisla-
tive proposals which address surrogacy. 
A. Baby Selling 
Surrogate parenting raises the broad question of whether the prac-
tice enriches us, "by providing children for those who cannot otherwise 
have them, or ... degrade[s] us by turning children into a commodity."67 
The greatest impediment to the legalization of surrogate parenting ar-
rangements is the universal condemnation of baby selling and buying. 68 
Contracts which contemplate the payment of money to a child's biologi-
cal parents in connection with adoption or the termination of parental 
rights are widely viewed to be contracts for the sale of babies, and there-
fore contrary to public policy.69 
The recent scarcity of the kinds of infants most sought-after for 
adoption has created a "black market" for babies. 70 In an effort to com-
bat the evils of these underground markets, most states have enacted 
adoption statutes that prohibit payment in exchange for a biological par-
ent's consent to adoption.71 Many of these statutes prohibit the payment 
of fees of any kind, with the exception of enumerated medical and legal 
approval of department of human services, no person shall knowingly become a 
party to separation of a child from its parents). 
66. See Johnson, The Baby "M" Decision: Specific Performance of a Contract for Spe-
cially Manufactured Goods, 11 S. ILL U.L.J. 1339, 1342-43 (1987). 
67. Nightline: New Jersey Surrogate Motherhood Ruling (ABC television broadcast, 
Feb. 3, 1988). 
68. See, e.g., Parks v. Parks, 209 Ky. 127, 132, 272 S.W. 419, 422 (1928) (children 
cannot be made the subject of a barter); Hooks v. Bridgewater, Ill Tex. 122, 131, 
229 S.W. 1114, 1118 (1921) (The bartering away of children "tends to the destruc-
tion of one of the finest relations of human life, to the subversion of the family tie, 
and to the reversal of an ordering of nature which is essential to human happiness 
and the security of society."). 
69. See Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, 185 S.E.2d 387 (1971); Barwin v. Reidy, 62 
N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957); Fox v. Lasley, 212 Or. 80, 318 P.2d 933 (1957). 
70. See Legal Problems, supra note 18, at 154; Katz, supra note 29, at 7-8. "'Black 
market' refers to placements made by a middleman, a 'baby broker' engaged in the 
business of providing babies for eager prospective parents. 'This middleman has no 
altruistic reason for being in the baby business. He is in the trade for the profit and 
his fees are often exorbitant.'" Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-
1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173, 179 (1983) (citation omitted). Estimates indicate that 
there are approximately five thousand black market adoptions per year. Katz, supra 
note 29, at 8 n.32. 
71. SeeN. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 17, at 273 (1981 review of state adoption laws 
revealed that payment of any compensation beyond expenses in connection with 
adoption was illegal in 41 states). In the 1989 Legislative session, Maryland 
adopted a statute which prohibits the sale, barter or trade of a child. Act of May 19, 
1989, ch. 300, 1989 Md. Laws- (to be codified at Mn. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 35B). 
120 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
expenses. 72 While these laws, often referred to as baby-broker acts, may 
vary from state to state, each is designed to prevent baby brokers from 
exploiting expectant mothers who are unwilling or financially unable to 
raise children. 73 
The strict application of an adoption statute which prohibits pay-
ment of any compensation in connection with adoptions is likely to block 
the enforcement of most surrogate parenting contracts. h Maryland, for 
example, the adoption statute provides: 
An agency, institution, or individual who renders any service in 
connection with the placement of an individual for adoption 
may not charge or receive from or on behalf of either the natu-
ral parent of the individual to be adopted, or from or on behalf 
of the individual who is adopting the individual, any compensa-
tion for the placement. 74 
The discouragement of contracts arranged by third-party intermediaries 
such as surrogate placement agencies would appear to be one of the ex-
plicit objectives of this statute. 75 
72. For a recent list, see Note, Developing a Concept, supra note 28, at 1290 n.53; Katz, 
supra note 29, at 8 n.34. 
73. See Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986); 
In reAdoption of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 977, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 
(1986); Katz, supra note 29, at 8 n.34; Note, Developing a Concept, supra note 28, at 
1291-92 n. 71. As one report explained: 
"Since there is great demand for infants and profits to be made, some at-
torneys act like entrepreneurs seeking to increase the supply of infants and 
to keep their overheads low. Both strategies have their human conse-
quences. To increase the supply of children, the attorney may maintain 
agreements with a number of women to produce children for a price. His 
agents may work in areas where the likelihood of illegitimate births is 
great. He may give fees to physicians or college counsellors who steer 
pregnant young women into his network. To keep his overhead low, he 
does not provide the services that may be needed by the biological parents 
who are likely to be adolescent 'at risk' youth. Further, he does not inves-
tigate the potential adoptive parents carefully. Consequently, children are 
often placed with couples who, for sound reasons, should not have re-
ceived a child." 
SUBCOMM. ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR Al'ID 
PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTIONS: SOME 
KEY POLICY ISSUES 21 (Comm. Print 1975). 
74. Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 5-327(a)(l) (1984). Violators are subject to prosecu-
tion for a misdemeanor; they may be fined up to $100 and/or imprisoned for up to 
three months. /d. § 5-327(c)-(d). Reasonable and customary charges or fees for 
medical or legal services are permitted by any interested person. /d. § 5-327(a)(2). 
75. Jorgensen, Surrogate Parenting, CURRENT THERAPY OF INFERTILITY, 1984-1985 
298 (1985). If the service provided by a commercial surrogate agency did not in-
clude adoption by the father's wife, then placing the child with the biological father 
would not violate adoption statutes. In a non-adoption arrangement, the surrogate 
or agency might be able to collect substantial payments from the biological father 
and/or his wife, since the surrogate's action could be characterized as consent to 
custody rather than to adoption. See Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate 
Gestation, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. (Rutgers Univ.) 107, 127-31 (1982). The obvious 
drawback of this arrangement is that it preserves parental rights of the surrogate 
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It is possible, however, that the baby-broker statutes are inapplicable 
to surrogate contracts. The overriding objective of these statutes is to 
regulate arrangements between a mother and strangers. 76 An agreement 
between parents for the support and custody of a child which involves 
adoption by the spouse of the custodial parent, however, is not as offen-
sive to public policy as is a contract between strangers for the adoption of 
a child. 77 In addition, as proponents of surrogate parenting point out, a 
surrogate arrangement is not analogous to baby selling because there is a 
biological relationship between the natural father and the child. Conse-
quently, there is no sale of an unrelated baby.78 
Proponents of surrogacy also dismiss concerns that an unwed 
mother will part with her child because of societal pressure or that she 
will succumb to the financial inducements of the black market. It is ar-
gued that because a surrogate engages in the transaction before concep-
tion, she is not subject to these pressures. The termination of her 
parental rights and her consent to custody are, according to this view, 
voluntary acts done in the absence of coercion. 79 
The proponents of surrogate contracts also contend that baby-bro-
ker statutes are inapplicable to surrogate arrangements because the con-
tract fee is paid for the surrogate's services, not for the child. 80 
mother, including visitation privileges. Consequently, one of the primary goals of 
the receiving couple would be defeated: the wife would not have the legal relation-
ship of mother to the child. If the natural father's wife would settle for the relation-
ship of step-mother, however, the adoption statutes might not have any bearing on 
surrogate arrangements. The natural father does not adopt his own child, he seeks 
custody. 
76. See Keane, Litigation, Legislation, and Limelight: Obstacles to Commercial Surro-
gate Mother Arrangements, 72 IowA L. REv. 415, 426 (1987); see also Note, Devel-
oping a Concept, supra note 28, at 1291. 
77. The courts are not in accord about the validity of custody agreements between the 
natural parents. For cases upholding the right to contract in custody and support 
disputes, see Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank, 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding 
a contract between putative father and mother in which the father assumed custody 
in exchange for a promise to provide for the mother in his will); Schumm v. Berg, 37 
Cal. 2d 174, 231 P.2d 39 (1951) (support agreement based on mother's forebearance 
from instituting paternity suit was not a waiver of any of child's rights before birth); 
Peterson v. Eritzland, 69 Wash. 2d 588, 419 P.2d 332 (1966) (upholding custody 
support agreement between natural parents where such agreements were consistent 
with state policies favoring support for illegitimate children). For cases denying the 
validity of custody agreements between the natural parents, see Ford v. Ford, 371 
U.S. 187 (1962) (parents cannot make agreements which bind courts as to outcome 
of custody case); Kimberling v. Rogers, 223 Ark. 348, 265 S.W.2d. 952 (1954) 
(mother cannot deprive herself of permanent custody through contract with father); 
Commonwealth ex. rei Teitelbaum v. Teitelbaum, 160 Pa. Super. 286, SO A.2d 713 
(1947) (dictum) (parents have no contractual property rights in child's custody 
concerning). 
78. See Legal Problems, supra note 18, at 155. 
79. See Note, Surrogate Mothers, supra note S, at 331. 
80. See Legal Problems, supra note 18, at 157. It has been argued that the surrogate 
mother is not paid for a baby per se, nor merely for her consent to adoption, but 
primarily for the risks she takes and the services she renders. The consideration is 
paid to her to conceive, carry the child for nine months, give birth, and then consent 
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Opponents concede that part of the fee is meant to compensate the 
mother for the insemination procedure and for the physical stresses and 
risks of pregnancy and childbirth, but emphasize that the ultimate goal 
of the arrangement is for the natural mother ·to carry the child to term 
and then to relinquish all her rights to her child in exchange for a fee. 81 
In the majority of cases, the surrogate mother is not an anonymous 
contributor to the arrangement. She usually meets the receiving couple 
before the child is conceived to formulate the contract terms and to agree 
upon their respective roles throughout the process. 82 Although not an 
absolute guarantee against baby-selling abuses, the biological relationship 
between the child and the husband of the receiving couple, along with the 
formality of the advance agreement, reduces the potential for unscrupu-
lous behavior which is inherent in the baby black market. 
B. Exploitation of Women 
Generally, a surrogate mother is in a lower socio-economic class and 
has less bargaining power than the receiving couple. 83 In addition, a sur-
rogate mother may be susceptible to the coercive tactics of third party 
agencies motivated by a desire for profits, and as a result she may agree 
to act as a surrogate without fully understanding the consequences of her 
decision. 84 This inherent potential for exploitation in surrogate arrange-
to adoption. In other words, the payment involved is for the procedure as a whole 
and not simply for the final step, the consent to adoption. Katz, supra note 29, at 
23-24; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
81. Pierce, Contract Law and the Surrogacy Issue (unpublished article) (copyright 1987 
by the Nat'! Comm. for Adoption, Inc.). 
82. See generally Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Sug-
gestions for Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 71 (1982); Note, Surrogate Mother Agree-
ments: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 467, 
478-79 (1982) (surrogate parenthood arrangements are planned and deliberate; the-
oretically there is no duress, hurried decision making, or bidding involved). 
83. In one study, approximately 40% of the applicants were unemployed or receiving 
some type of financial assistance. Their total annual family incomes ranged from 
$6,000 to $55,000. Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 117 (1983); see also Summary Findings of Dept. of Human 
Resources Report on Surrogate Mothering Programs in Maryland, at 1-2 (Aug. 1983) 
[hereinafter Summary Findings]. 
84. As noted in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY SURROGATE MOTHER PRO-
GRAMS IN MARYLAND, at 8 (Feb. 1983) (hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT), 
[O]ur society as a whole feels very strongly that no form of baby-selling 
should be permitted. In this connection, it should be noted that some sur-
rogate mother programs do charge the biological father and his wife a very 
high fee for the program's services. For example, we understand that the 
National Center for Surrogate Parenting, Inc. charges the biological father 
and his wife from $20,000 to $45,000. Of this sum, about $10,000 to 
$13,000 goes to the surrogate mother upon delivery of the child to the 
biological father. 
The Department of Human Resources observed in its report: "[T]he profit motive 
associated with surrogate mother programs ... [needs] to be dealt with immediately 
in the law as an initial step toward protection of the children, the surrogates, and 
the couples." Summary Findings, supra note 83, at 1. Some couples who are impa-
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ments poses a dilemma for feminists, because prohibiting the arrange-
ments would limit a woman's right of choice with respect to her body.85 
Some commentators argue that childbearing for a fee constitutes a type 
of voluntary servitude. 86 These issues will eventually need to be ad-
dressed by states that elect to permit some form of surrogate 
arrangements. 87 
C. Preservation of Marriage and the Family 
Courts or legislatures which determine that surrogate parenting 
agreements are unenforceable as against public policy may base their de-
cision on a conviction that surrogacy threatens the stability of the family 
unit, the sanctity of marriage, and the traditional ideas of the family. 88 It 
may be argued, however, that although surrogate arrangements are not 
traditional, they nevertheless promote the traditional family by providing 
a couple with a child who is at least biologically related to the father. 
Surrogate parenting may also strengthen the family by providing a solu-
tion to couples whose marriages are under stress because their desire for 
children is thwarted by the wife's infertility. 89 
tient with the lengthy evaluations required by certain agencies arrange private deals 
with fees for the mother "upwards of $50,000." N.Y. Times, June 26, 1988, at A1, 
col. 6. 
85. Sidney Callahan, an associate professor of psychology at Mercy College in New 
York, was reported as saying: "It has taken a long time for women to stop being 
only baby machines, with only certain parts of their bodies being used, and now here 
we are being used for uterus rentals .... This is going to end up as the final exploita-
tion of women. It is always going to be poor women who have the babies and the 
rich women who get them." N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1987, at Bl. col. 6; see also In the 
Best Interests of a Child, TIME, April 13, 1987, at 71 (questioning "whether surro-
gacy permits the more prosperous and sophisticated to exploit those who are less 
so"). 
86. William L. Pierce, a past president of the National Committee for Adoption, Inc., 
has stated that "these contracts should be declared null and void because even if it 
can somehow be proven that surrogacy does not involve baby selling, it certainly 
does involve a type of voluntary enslavement." Pierce, supra note 81, at 2. Pierce 
quoted Lawrence Tribe of Harvard Law School as saying in an April 2, 1987 inter-
view with The Washington Times that to conclude "that women have a right to sell 
themselves in what amounts to a kind of incubatory servitude seems to me to com-
pletely misundertand the rationale for Roe v. Wade." /d. Pierce also finds support 
in an editorial page article which appeared in The Wall Street Journal by Hadley 
Arkes, Professor of Jurisprudence at Amherst College, who observed that "the 
courts have refused to uphold contracts in which people voluntarily contracted 
themselves into peonage or slavery." /d. 
87. See Note, Surrogate Mothering: Medical Reality in a Legal Vacuum, 8 J. LEGIS. 
140, 146-47 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Surrogate Mothering). 
88. /d. at 147. 
89. See Legal Problems, supra note 18, at 155-56. William Pierce asserts that the con-
cern for the continuity of the male bloodline which lies behind many surrogate ar-
rangements is "anti-wife." Pierce, The Government Should Ban Surrogate 
Parenting (unpublished article) (copyright 1987 by the National Committee for 
Adoption, Inc.) 
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D. The Potential for Abuse of Surrogate Parenting Arrangements 
Even if it is agreed that the positive aspects of surrogate arrange-
ments outweigh the negative aspects, there are legitimate public policy 
concerns that the surrogate motherhood process might be abused or mis-
used. For example, controversial issues are raised when a healthy wo-
man chooses to employ a surrogate for convenience rather than for 
medical reasons.90 It might be fair to ask whether a woman who does 
not have time to bear a child would have the time or desire to raise a 
child. Similarly, when gay couples turn to surrogacy to obtain children, 
questions arise as to whether it is in the child's best interest to be raised 
in a homosexual environment.91 Opponents of surrogacy arrangements 
are also concerned that parties may agree to abort a fetus for non-medi-
cal reasons, such as when the fetus is not of the desired sex or if the 
natural father and his wife change their minds. 92 
An even greater cause for concern is the possibility that a situation 
might arise where, in contrast to the Baby M case, neither the surrogate 
nor the natural father wants the child because it is born with serious 
physical defects. The Stiver-Malahoff surrogate case is a dramatic exam-
ple of such a problem.93 In 1983, Judy Stiver, a surrogate mother, gave 
birth to a baby boy with microcephaly.94 Malahotf questioned whether 
he was the biological father and declared that he did not want the defec-
tive child. The surrogate mother and her husband also rejected the baby, 
arguing that according to the agreement Malahotf was wholly responsi-
ble for the child's care and custody. The controversy ended when blood 
tests revealed that the child's father was the surrogate's husband.95 This 
unfortunate example lends strong support to the argument that the state 
should do nothing to encourage the practice of creating children by 
contract. 
90. Some suggest that the procedure be limited to infertile couples and those with medi-
cal reasons for not having their own children. Cf Capron, supra note 6, at 697. 
91. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1987, at B2, col. 1. In one case, a surrogate mother "sued 
to keep her baby when she discovered that the woman who hired her to carry the 
child to term was a transexual." Statement to the House Judiciary Committee on 
House Bill 759, Re: "Surrogate Mother" Agreements, at 4 (Feb. 24, 1987) (statement 
by Maryland Catholic Conference to Maryland legislature.) 
92. Statement to the House Judiciary Committee on House Bill 759, supra note 91, at 4. 
93. See Friedrich, A Legal, Moral, Social Nightmare, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 54. 
94. /d. at 55. Microcephaly is a condition of abnormal smallness of the head and is 
usually associated with mental retardation. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW WORLD DIC-
TIONARY 1427 (1971). 
95. Friedrich, supra note 93, at 55. The test results were first announced on the Phil 
Donahue television show. /d. 
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V. THE LEGAL STATUS OF SURROGATE ARRANGEMENTS 
IN MARYLAND 
A. Current Legal Obstacles to the Enforcement of Surrogate Contracts 
in Maryland 
Legislatures in Maryland and in other states did not envision the 
issues surrounding surrogate contracts when they enacted their respec-
tive laws.96 In Maryland, concepts relevant to surrogate arrangements 
are found primarily in the Family Law, Health-General, and Estates and 
Trusts articles of the Maryland Annotated Code. These statutes provide 
an incomplete and sometimes inconsistent framework for the regulation 
of surrogate arrangements. 97 
Five areas of Maryland law are relevant to the question of the legal-
ity and enforceability of surrogate arrangements: (1) adoption consent 
laws;98 (2) artificial insemination laws;99 (3) legitimacy and paternity 
laws; 100 (4) custody laws; 101 and (5) laws regarding birth certificates. 102 
1. Adoption Consent Laws 
All fifty states have statutes permitting natural parents to revoke 
consent to adoption before the child's birth or for some time after 
birth. 103 In Maryland, the law prohibits the entry of a final decree of 
adoption until at least fifteen days after the birth of the child, 104 and 
grants the natural parents the right to revoke consent at any time before 
the final decree or within ninety days of filing their consent, whichever 
96. See Legal Problems, supra note 18, at 158; see also Note, The Rights of the Biological 
Father: From Adoption and Custody to Surrogate Motherhood, 12 VT. L. REV. 87, 
103 (1987). 
97. Two Maryland surrogate mother agencies are currently operating in this legal vac-
uum: Infertility Associates, International, in Chevy Chase, and Surrogate Mother-
hood, Inc., in Germantown. These centers are for-profit organizations which 
contract with infertile couples who wish· to have a child by a woman who wants to 
be a surrogate. Using screening and testing procedures of their own devising, the 
agencies select individuals to participate in surrogate parenting programs, match 
surrogates with receiving couples, and arrange a contract which offers certain safe-
guards to the parties by clarifying their rights and duties. Summary Findings, supra 
note 83, at 3. To date, no disputes arising out of surrogate contracts arranged by 
these centers have been brought before a Maryland appellate court. 
98. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-301 to -330 (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
99. MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974). 
100. /d. § 1-208; MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1028 (Supp. 1988). 
101. MD. FAM. LAw CoDE ANN. § 5-203 (1984 & Supp. 1988). 
102. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-201 to -227 (1982 & Supp. 1988). 
103. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-107B (1974) (prohibiting consent within 72 
hours after birth); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082 (West 1985) (consent shall be executed 
after birth); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1511 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (father's consent 
permitted during pregnancy, but mother or father may revoke within 72 hours after 
birth); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 199.500(5) (Baldwin 1987) (invalidating mother's 
consent to adoption given prior to fifth day after birth); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9.422.6(A)(9) (West Supp. 1988) (prohibiting surrender for adoption prior to fifth 
day after child's birth). 
104. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-324 (1984). 
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comes first. 105 The Maryland legislature stated that its purposes in en-
acting the adoption statute were to protect children from unnecessary 
separation from their natural parents, 106 to prevent adoption by individu-
als who are unfit for the responsibility, 107 and to protect natural parents 
from a hurried or ill-considered decision to give up a child. 108 The stat-
ute's provisions reflect a state policy that children should remain with 
their natural families, secure from state intervention, unless the interests 
of the child would best be served by adoption. 109 Because surrogate ar-
rangements require the child to be separated from its natural mother 
without considering the best interests of the child, they conflict with this 
policy. Thus, the adoption statute represents an obstacle to the enforce-
ment of surrogate contracts. 
Surrogate arrangements ordinarily provide for the termination of 
the surrogate mother's parental rights in contemplation of adoption of 
the child by the wife of the biological father. 110 Termination of parental 
rights, however, is an extraordinary judicial power which is cautiously 
exercised. 111 A Maryland court will grant a decree of adoption without 
the consent of the child's parents only under circumstances which 
demonstrate that the parents either have abandoned the child or repre-
sent a danger to him or her. 112 In addition, the court must find by clear 
105. Mo. PAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-311(c)(1) (Supp. 1988). The consent of a natural 
parent to adoption is not valid unless the consent form contains express notice of the 
right to revoke. Id. § 5-314(a) (1984). The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
has held that Maryland Rule 2-535(a), when construed together with the Family 
Law article of the Maryland Annotated Code, safeguards the interests ofthe natural 
parent by allowing the court to revoke the entry of the final order of adoption if 
"[t)he natural parent ... create[s] in the trial judge's mind 'a reasonable doubt that 
justice has been served.'" In reAdoption No. 85365027/AD, 71 Md. App. 362, 
367, 525 A.2d 1081, 1083 (1987). 
106. Mo. PAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-303(b)(l) (1984). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. § 5-303(b)(2); see also In reAdoption No. 85365027/AD, 71 Md. App. at 366, 
525 A.2d at 1083 ("In cases of adoption, ... notions of equity, statutory and case 
law all attempt to safeguard the parental rights of the natural mother and father."). 
109. See Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 157 A.2d 273 (1960). In Gardner, the court 
noted that the legislature and the court of appeals have made sure, "as far as possi-
ble, that adoption shall not be granted over parental objection unless that course 
clearly is justified. The welfare and the best interests of the child must be weighed 
with great care against every just claim of an objecting parent." Id. at 284, 157 
A.2d at 276; see also Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17 PAM. 
L.Q. 173, 184-85 (1983). 
110. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396,470-71, 537 A.2d 1227, 1265-66 (1988) (para-
graph 1-3 of the surrogate contract). In Maryland, the biological father's wife 
would file a petition for adoption pursuant to sections 5-315(a) and 5-322 of the 
Family Law Article. See MD. PAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-315(a), 5-322 (1984 & 
Supp. 1987). 
111. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring clear and convincing evi-
dence for irrevocable termination of natural parents' rights); see also Cohen, Surro-
gate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It?, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 243, 279 (1985). 
112. The common bases for adoption without parental consent include clear and con-
vincing evidence that the natural parent: 
(1) has not maintained meaningful contact with the child during the time 
1988] Surrogate Arrangements in Maryland 127 
and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interests to terminate 
the natural parent's rights. 113 Consequently, the Maryland courts could 
readily conclude, as did the New Jersey Supreme Court, 114 that surrogate 
contracts are unenforceable because they conflict with laws requiring 
proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of paren-
tal rights may be ordered, or because they conflict with laws that require 
that surrender of custody and consent to adoption be revocable in private 
placement adoptions. 
Many commentators argue that legislative action is necessary to 
provide separate rules for surrogate contract adoptions because they are 
distinguishable from other adoptions. 115 A surrogate mother's decision 
to terminate her parental rights is not founded in an attempt to avoid the 
consequences of an unwanted pregnancy or the financial problems inher-
ent in raising a child, considerations usually present in other adop-
tions.116 The surrogate agreement is entered into before conception, 
whereas most adoptions are arranged after conception. Furthermore, in 
a typical adoption the child is not related to either adopting parent, while 
in surrogacy, the child is genetically related to the natural father. Be-
cause the surrogate arrangement can result in a hybrid of custody and 
adoption, rather than in pure adoption, different statutory treatment may 
be warranted. 
2. Custody Statutes 
If a court, upon the surrogate's refusal to relinquish custody, specifi-
cally enforced the contract, custody statutes would be irrelevant to reso-
lution of the dispute and parental rights would be controlled by the 
agreement between the parties. But if, as in the Baby M case, the court 
the petitioner has had custody despite the opportunity to do so; (2) has 
repeatedly failed to contribute to the physical care and support of the child 
although financially able to do so; or (3) has been convicted of child abuse 
of the child. 
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-312(b)(4) (Supp. 1988). 
113. Courtney v. Richmond, 55 Md. App. 382, 462 A.2d 1223 (1983); MD. FAM. LAW 
CODE ANN. §§ 5-312(b)(l), 5-313(a) (Supp. 1988); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 
753 (interference with fundamental right to care for and raise children must be 
based upon a compelling state interest). The Maryland adoption without consent 
statute also requires that the child remain out of the custody of the natural parent 
for at least one year and that the adopting parent excercise control or custody over 
the child for at least six months. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-312(b), (b)(2) 
(Supp. 1988). Visitation agreements are permitted and are specifically enforceable 
unless they are contrary to the best interests of the child. See Weinschel v. Strople, 
56 Md. App. 252, 466 A.2d 1301 (1983); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-312(e) 
(Supp. 1988). 
114. See Baby M, 109 N.J. at 444-47, 537 A.2d at 1251-53. 
115. Note, Surrogate Motherhood Agreements: The Law in Pennsylvania, 91 DICK L. 
REV. 1085, 1097 (1987); Note, Developing a Concept, supra note 28, at 1292; Note, 
Womb for Rent: A Call for Pennsylvannia Legislation Legalizing and Regulating 
Surrogate Parenting Agreements, 90 DICK. L. REV. 227, 251-59 (1985). 
116. See Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 
1986); Note, Surrogate Mothers, supra note 5, at 331. 
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voided the contract and denied the father specific performance, custody 
statutes would be likely to govern the resolution of the dispute. Because 
custody awards do not irrevocably alter parent-child relationships, courts 
may be more likely to award custody to the natural father than to termi-
nate the parental rights of the surrogate mother. 
Under the equitable doctrine of parens patriae, 117 the state is the 
ultimate arbiter in custody battles. 118 The Maryland courts have the au-
thority to award custody of a minor child to either parent. 119 The scope 
of inquiry in any custody proceeding must concern the needs of the par-
ticular child and each of the parties' relationship with the child. 120 The 
welfare of the child is paramount to the claims of either parent, and care 
and custody must be awarded with regard to the child's best interests. 121 
Many of the factors typically relied upon in custody determina-
tions122 are applicable to the adoption/custody hybrid characteristic of 
surrogate arrangements. 123 "Abandonment" by the surrogate mother 
could be a critical issue. A Maryland court might interpret the natural 
mother's willingness to enter into the contract as·evidence of her intent to 
117. Parens patriae is defined as "literally, 'parent of the country,' [and] refers tradition-
ally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). This power, which the English 
court first articulated in the seventeenth century, rests upon the theory that "while 
the law of nature gives to parents the right to the custody of their children, a child 
from the time of its birth owes an allegiance to the state, and the state in return is 
obligated to regulate the custody of the child whenever necessary for its welfare." 
Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952). 
118. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 176, 372 A.2d 582, 586 (1977). 
119. Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-203 (c)(1) (Supp. 1988). Since 1974, the maternal 
preference doctrine has been abolished in child custody cases. See McAndrew v. 
McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978); Mo. FAM. LAW CoDE ANN. 
§ 5-203(c)(2) (Supp. 1988). 
120. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. at 9, 382 A.2d at 1086. 
121. Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303, 508 A.2d 964,970 (1986); Hoffman, 280 Md. at 
174-75, 372 A.2d at 585; Miller v. Miller, 191 Md: 396, 407, 62 A.2d 293, 298 
(1948); see also Ester, Maryland Child Custody Law- Fully Committed to the Child's 
Best Interests?, 41 Mo. L. REV. 225 (1982); Comment, Best Interests of the Child: 
Maryland Child Custody Disputes, 31 Mo. L. REV. 641 (1978). 
122. In determining what is in the best interests of the child for purposes of custody 
determinations, courts consider a variety of factors: 
[T]he fitness of the persons seeking custody, the adaptability of the pro-
spective custodian to the task, the age, sex and health of the child, the 
physical, spiritual and moral well-being of the child, the environment and 
surroundings in which the child will be reared, the influences likely to be 
exerted on the child, and, if he or she is old enough to make a rational 
choice, the preference of the child. 
Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 357, 157 A.2d 442, 446 (1960). 
123. For example, in its review of the surrogate arrangement employed in Baby M, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey strongly condemned the contract's total disregard for 
the best interests of the child. Justice Wilentz observed: 
There is not the slightest suggestion that any inquiry will be made at any 
time to determine the fitness of the Sterns as custodial parents, of Mrs. 
Stern as an adoptive parent, their superiority to Mrs. Whitehead, or the 
effect on the child of not living with her natural mother. 
Baby M, 109 N.J. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248. 
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terminate her parental rights through abandonment. 124 Similarly, a 
court might also determine that the natural mother's decision to enter 
into a surrogate contract constituted abandonment at the outset, and 
consequently find the natural father, who intended to have custody at the 
outset, to be the more "fit" parent for the child. 125 If the natural father 
and his wife were deemed to be a party to the surrogate's abandonment, 
however, a court resolving custody in the best interests of the child 
would be required to choose the lesser of the two perceived evils. 
3. Artificial Insemination Laws 
In Maryland, a child conceived by artificial insemination of a mar-
ried woman with the consent of her husband is presumed to be the legiti-
mate child of the woman and her husband. 126 Most states have a similar 
statutory scheme for establishing patemity. 127 The purpose of these stat-
utes is to prevent the sperm donor from raising the issue of paternity and 
to protect the donor from legal responsibility for any children conceived 
by the use of his semen.12s 
The legislature probably did not contemplate surrogate arrange-
ments when it enacted the artificial insemination legitimacy presumption, 
since the statute works against the intent of a natural father in the surro-
gacy context. 129 The presumption that the natural mother's husband is 
the father of the child is rebuttable, 130 however, and the court can order 
124. According to section S-203(a)(2) of the Family Law article of the Maryland Anno-
tated Code, "[a] parent is the sole natural guardian of the minor child if the other 
parent ... abandons the family .... "Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-203(a)(2) 
(1984). Abandonment for one year coupled with failure to maintain contact or pro-
vide financial support would appear to satisfy the elements necessary to terminate 
the natural parents' rights as to the child without their consent. See id. § 5-
312(b)(2) (Supp. 1988). 
125. Cohen, supra note 111, at 275. A New Mexico court held that the parents' act of 
consenting to adoption in exchange for $400 constituted abandonment as a matter 
of law. See Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 196, 307 P.2d 175, 184 (1957). 
126. Mo. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.§ 1-206(b) (1974);·Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 
§ 5-1028(c) (Supp. 1988). The husband's consent to the artificial insemination is 
presumed. Mo. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974). 
127. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1987); 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1986); 
CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 45-69fto 69n (1981); GA. CODE ANN.§ 19-7-21 (1982); ILL 
ANN. STAT. ch.40 para. 1451-53 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 23-128 to -130 (1981); LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1983); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2824, 700.ll1 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 257.56 (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 126-061 (1985); N.Y. DOM. REL LAW§ 73 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 49A-1 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-553 (West Supp. 1987); OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1987); 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 12.03 (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-7.1 (1987); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 26.26.050 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 767.47(9) (West 
1981), § 891.40 (West Supp. 1987); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986). 
128. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALL. REv. 611, 614 (1978). 
129. See Mo. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974). 
130. /d. § 1-105(b). 
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the surrogate's husband and the adopting father to submit to blood tests 
to determine which one is the child's biological father. 131 If parentage 
cannot be confirmed through blood tests, the natural father could argue 
that the presumption of paternity was intended to apply only to artificial 
insemination arrangements, not to surrogate contracts. The natural fa-
ther could also argue that because his intent in entering into the surro-
gate arrangement was to attain full parental responsibility, he should not 
be treated by law in the same manner as the man who anonymously do-
nates his sperm. 132 
4. Legitimacy and Paternity Laws 
Maryland's legitimacy and paternity laws raise the same presump-
tion of paternity as do the artificial insemination statutes. 133 Although 
the presumption is rebuttable, 134 the party who is not married to the 
mother carries the burden of establishing that he is the father of the 
child. 135 In Maryland, the only proof necessary to rebut the presumption 
is a showing that the husband and wife lived separately and apart at the 
time of conception. 136 Nevertheless, because paternity determinations 
are made on a case-by-case basis after a child's birth, even a rebuttable 
presumption with a light burden of proof does not guarantee that the 
131. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 5-1029(a) (1984). "The legislative intent in adopting 
[a blood testing] statute was to protect illegitimate children through court ordered 
support based upon a sophisticated and reliable genetic test." Haines v. Shanholtz, 
57 Md. App. 92, 96, 468 A.2d 1365, 1367 (1984). 
132. Cohen, supra note 111, at 266. 
133. Compare MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 1-206(b), 1-105(b) (1974) with MD. 
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1028 (Supp. 1988). 
134. Section 5-1028(c) of the Family Law article of the Maryland Annotated Code pro-
vides: "There is a rebuttable presumption that the child is the legitimate child of the 
man to whom its mother was married at the time of conception." Mo. FAM. LAW 
CODE ANN. § 5-1028(c) (Supp. 1988). Generally, this presumption places the pa-
ternity of a child born during marriage on the mother's husband. J. Long, A Trea-
tise on the Law of Domestic Relations § 252 (1923). In Maryland, however, the 
husband is not required to support a child who, though born to his wife during 
wedlock, was not sired by him. See Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 
(1986). 
135. Mo. FAM LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1028(a) (Supp. 1988). 
136. See Corley v. Moore, 236 Md. 241, 203 A.2d 697 (1964); Downes v. Kidwell, 14 
Md. App. 92, 286 A.2d 199 (1972); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 5-1028(c)(2)-(4) 
(Supp. 1988). As in the artificial insemination context, the natural father also has 
the option of filing a motion to require the putative father to submit to a blood test 
pursuant to Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1029(a) (1984). Some jurisdictions, 
however, have established a standard which makes overturning the presumption 
extremely difficult. See, e.g., Hanley v. Flanigan, 104 Misc. 2d 698, 700, 428 
N.Y.S.2d 865, 867 (1980) (presumption of legitimacy will not fail unless common 
sense and reason are outraged); Ewell v. Ewell, 163 N.C. 233, 79 S.E. 509 (1913) 
(presumption that husband is the father unless he could not have been because of 
impotence or non-access). The increasing use of artificial insemination and the in-
creasing sophistication of paternity tests are contributing to the decline of the near-
absolute rule that once characterized the paternity presumption. See, e.g., Cherchez 
Ia Gene, THE EcONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1986, at 66-67 (reliable new genetic test for pater-
nity and maternity introduced). 
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biological father will be recognized as the child's actual father. 137 
Generally, the state's interest in the presumption of paternity is in 
"promoting the marital relationship [and] preserving intact an existing 
family unit .... " 138 The state legislatures are also motivated by a desire 
to protect the rights of illegitimate children 139 and by a desire to provide 
adequate support for children born out of wedlock. 140 But the paternity 
presumptions do not allocate rights and obligations in the ways the par-
ties to surrogate arrangements intend; paternal rights and responsibilities 
are placed upon the husband of the surrogate mother even though at the 
time of contracting he had no direct interest in the arrangement or in the 
resulting child. The natural father, on the other hand, is hindered in 
asserting his parental rights because the paternity presumption lies m 
favor of the surrogate's husband. 
5. Birth Certificate Laws 
Maryland laws regarding birth certificates141 reflect the strong state 
interest in preserving the accuracy of vital records and in protecting their 
confidentiality. 142 Every birth certificate must include the name of the 
biological mother and father, if known. 143 Agencies which arrange sur-
rogate contracts sometimes promise the parties that no one, not even the 
child, will be allowed to ascertain the identity of the surrogate mother. 
In order to achieve this anonymity, the surrogate contract might provide 
that the surrogate mother's name is not to appear on the birth certifi-
cate.144 Such a provision, however, would violate the Health-General 
137. In jurisdictions where the burden of proof for rebuttal is heavier than in Maryland, 
legitimacy laws raise a barrier to paternity which is difficult to overcome. For ex-
ample, in In re Baby Girl, the Kentucky circuit court required clear and convinc!ng 
evidence that a child "born to a husband and wife" was the illegitimate child of a 
third person. Consequently, an affidavit of artificial insemination, without proof of 
blood grouping and nonaccess by the husband, was insuffiCient. In re Baby Girl, 9 
Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2348, 2348 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 1983). 
138. Petitioner F. v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Del. 1981). 
139. As one California appellate court has stated, this presumption exists to protect the 
child from the social stigma of illegitimacy. Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 
619, 624, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 11 (1981). 
140. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 420 Mich. 367, 374, 362 N.W.2d 211, 214 (1985). 
141. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-201 to -227 (1982 & Supp. 1988). 
142. The Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene is charged with administering the rec-
ordation of birth certificates and other vital records. Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CODE 
ANN. § 4-203(a) (1982). The Secretary's duties are to collect, preserve and protect 
birth certificates and to record accurate information. 63 Op. Att'y Gen. 670, 673 
(1978). A copy of a birth certificate may be issued only on order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction, on request of the individual to whom the record relates, or 
on request of a parent, guardian, or other authorized representative of the individ-
ual. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4-217(b) (Supp. 1988). 
143. Telephone interview with clerk of Maryland State Department of Vital Records 
(February 26, 1988). The Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene establishes the 
appropriate procedures and the necessary forms for the accurate registration of vital 
records pursuant to MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4-203(b) (1982). 
144. The inability to obtain information on family medical history injures the interests of 
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article ofthe Maryland Annotated Code, which provides that "[a] person 
may not willfully provide false information for entry or willfully enter 
false information on a certificate of birth .... " 145 It might also violate 
the code section which prohibits the willful alteration of birth 
certificates. 146 
If the surrogate mother voluntarily terminates her parental rights 
and the court allows the child to be adopted by the natural father's wife, 
the surrogate arrangement can be made to comply with the birth certifi-
cate statutes. The Maryland Annotated Code provides for issuance of a 
new certificate of birth after an adoption decree is entered. 147 The adop-
tive parents are recorded as the parents of the child, 148 and the new birth 
certificate replaces the original. 149 In the surrogate context, the father's 
name would already be on the certificate, and his wife's name would re-
place the surrogate mother's name. The original certificate of birth and 
all records that relate to the new certificate would be placed under 
seal.t5o 
B. Constitutional Issues 
The Baby M court dismissed or declined to rule on the constitu-
tional challenges raised by Mr. Stem and Mrs. Whitehead. 151 To find the 
constitutional challenges controlling in the Baby M case, the court would 
have had to broadly construe the decisions recognizing a constitutional 
right of privacy. If a state regulates surrogate arrangements by statute, 
however, it may find it necessary to reconcile its statutory scheme with 
the growing body of law recognizing privacy in reproductive decision-
making as a substantive constitutional right. 
In 1923, the United States Supreme Court found that the constitu-
tional guarantee of liberty included the right to "marry, establish a home 
and bring up children." 152 Two decades later, in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 153 the Court held that the power to procreate is a "basic lib-
erty" and a "basic civil right," and that "marriage and procreation are 
. children born of surrogates. Note, Representation for the Child, supra note 19, at 
180-81. . 
145. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4~226(b) (1982). Violators who provide false 
information are subject to a fine not to exceed $100. /d. § 4-227(1). 
146. /d. § 4-226(c). Violators who willfully alter the birth certificates are subject to a fine 
not to exceed $500 or imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both. /d. § 4-
227(4). 
147. /d. § 4-211(a)(2)(ii), (b)(3) (Supp. 1988). 
148. /d. § 4-211(d)(3) (Supp. 1988). 
149. /d. § 4-211(e)(1)(i) (1982). 
150. /d. § 4-211(e)(l)(ii) (1982). The seal may be broken only on order of court or on 
written order of a designee of the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene as long as 
the confidentiality of the record is not violated. /d. § 4-211(e)(2)(ii) (1982). 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58. 
152. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
153. 316 u.s. 535 (1942). 
1988] Surrogate Arrangements in Maryland 133 
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 154 These 
rights were extended by one of the Court's most far-reaching decisions, 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 155 which established a fundamental right to pri-
vacy for married persons. Subsequently, in Eisenstadt v. Baird 156 the 
Court noted that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child."157 
Because surrogate arrangements involve personal decisions relating 
to procreative choice, the right of individuals to engage in these arrange-
ments might be constitutionally protected by Griswold and Eisenstadt. 158 
If surrogate arrangements are protected, it could be difficult for state-
imposed restrictions on surrogates arrangements to pass constitutional 
muster. But even if the right to engage in a surrogacy contract is consti-
tutionally protected, the right of privacy is not absolute; it may be limited 
by the states' legitimate and compelling interests in the subject matter. 159 
Consequently, the regulation of surrogate parenting could be justified by 
compelling state interests in the health and well-being of children if no 
less restrictive means of protecting those interests is available. 160 
Additional privacy issues arise from the fact that surrogacy con-
tracts may limit a surrogate's choice regarding abortion. For example, 
most contracts prohibit the surrogate from aborting for non-medical rea-
sons.161 Furthermore, some contracts require abortion when amni-
ocentesis reveals a genetic or congenital defect. 162 In Roe v. Wade, 163 
however, the right of personal privacy was extended to encompass a wo-
154. /d. at 541. 
155. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
156. 405 u.s. 438 (1972). 
157. /d. at 453 (emphasis in original). 
158. See Legal Problems, supra note 18, at 161-64; Coleman, supra note 82, at 75-82; 
Cohen, supra note 111, at 256-57. It may be argued, however, that surrogate ar-
rangements are not protected by the right of privacy because they are qualitatively 
different from the child bearing decisions protected by Griswold and Eisenstadt. For 
example, surrogate arrangements involve contractual agreements to obtain a child 
rather than a personal decision to bear or beget a child. See Rushevsky, supra note 
75, at 112; Cohen, supra note 111, at 257. Similarly, because surrogate arrange-
ments necessarily involve third parties, the arrangement may not be sufficiently 
"private" to involve constitutional protection. See Rushevsky, supra note 75, at 
112-13. 
159. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Rushevsky, supra note 75, at 110-11. 
160. See Carey v. Population Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); see also Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized that the state's 
interest in the fetus began at the end of the first trimester and increased as viability 
increased; after viability, the state had an absolute right to regulate and intervene. 
/d. at 163. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, reiterating Roe v. Wade, stated that 
when the fetus becomes viable, state interest prevails. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 449 n.13, 
537 A.2d at 1254 n.13. 
161. See, e.g., Baby M, 109 N.J. at 473, 537 A.2d at 1268. 
162. See id. 
163. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
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man's decision as to whether to terminate her pregnancy. 164 Accord-
ingly, in light of Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases, 165 a regulatory 
scheme which permitted enforcement of either type of provision would 
be open to constitutional challenge. 
Finally, questions of sex discrimination could be raised by regula-
tions that invalidate surrogate parenting arrangements if the surrogate 
receives consideration beyond her medical expenses. By acknowledging 
that the practice of artificial insemination exists, Maryland law tacitly 
permits a man to sell his sperm. 166 Artificial insemination by donor167 is 
in many respects the biological counterpart to surrogacy.l68 Because the 
surrogate mother's role parallels that of the man who sells his sperm, it 
can be maintained that a woman should have the right to sell her ovum, 
and that any statutory distinctions in the treatment of surrogate mothers 
and sperm donors would constitute unconstitutional gender classifica-
tion.169 In states such as Maryland that have passed an equal rights 
amendment to their state's constitution, 170 such potentially discrimina-
tory legislation might be subject to the highest level of equal protection 
scrutiny. · 
VI. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE 
MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
In Maryland, as in other states, the 1988 legislative session was no-
table for the consideration given to bills drafted in response to the Baby 
M decision. 171 The fact that so few states have succeeded in passing leg-
islation dealing explicitly with surrogate arrangements indicates the diffi-
culty of the task that legislators face. 172 
164. Id. at 153. 
165. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
166. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-214 (1987); MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. 
§ 1-206(b) (1974). 
167. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
168. See Coleman, supra note 82, at 81-82; Legal Problems, supra note 18, at 153 (artifi-
cial insemination by donor constitutes male counterpart to surrogate motherhood); 
Lorio, supra note 14, at 1653 (surrogate's role is analogous to that of artificial in-
semination by donor). 
169. See Coleman, supra note 82, at 81; Lorio, supra note 14, at 1653. 
170. In Maryland, the Equal Rights Amendment provides: "Equality of rights under the 
law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex." MD. DECL. OF RTS art. 46. 
171. The lower court decision in the 1987 Baby M litigation also caused consternation 
among the state legislatures. In Maryland, Delegate Tyras S. Athey introduced a 
proposal to regulate surrogate mother agreements which noted on the cover sheet 
that it was "imperative that we act to save other children from being in the same 
'legal limbo' as 'Baby M'." H.B. No. 759, 1987 Md. Leg. Sess. This bill eventually 
died in the House Judiciary Committee. 
172. As of October 1988, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky and Michigan had enacted laws 
which ban surrogate parenting arrangements involving compensation and impose 
criminal sanctions on violators. Nebraska and Lousiana have enacted laws that 
make contracts involving compensation void and unenforceable, but they do not 
further penalize violators. National Conference of State Legislators, Bill Introduc-
tions in 1988 Legislative Sessions Relating to Surrogacy Contracts, at 1-3 (October 
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The legality of surrogate arrangements must be clarified. Not only 
would the legitimacy and paternity of surrogate children remain unset-
tled by a failure to legislatively address surrogate arrangements, but the 
children's well being would be threatened, the courts would continue to 
be burdened with questions about the enforceability of the contracts, and 
surrogate parenthood agencies would remain unregulated. A clear legis-
lative statement of the consequences of entering into a surrogate arrange-
ment would both prevent a certain number of contracts from being 
entered into and would aid in the resolution of any dispute. Conse-
quently, the remaining question is whether the interests of all concerned 
are best protected by regulating surrogate arrangements or by banning 
them altogether. 
A. Absolute Prohibition 
One commentator suggests that "this human and societal experi-
mentation" should be put to an end until there has been a full investiga-
tion of all of the implications that such arrangements have for the 
children created, their siblings, the surrogate, those who expect to obtain 
the child, the various social institutions that will be affected (including 
adoption and "the family," as that institution is perceived by society), 
and family law. 173 This sentiment appears to be reflected by the legisla-
tures of the various states, which so far have either prohibited or have 
been reluctant to endorse the practice of surrogacy. 174 
A ban on surrogate arrangements may take several forms. The sig-
nificant variables are the scope of the ban (i.e. , whether it extends to all 
such arrangements or only to those for compensation) and the sanctions 
for violation of the ban. The six states which to date have enacted laws 
banning surrogate arrangements have all focused on contracts involving 
compensation, either to the surrogate or to a third-party agency; no state 
has explicitly banned agreements where no money is exchanged. 175 
Preplanned adoptions are also covered by some of the new statutes. 176 
12, 1988) (unpublished report) [hereinafter Bill Introductions Report). In 1988, 16 
states introduced 22 bills to regulate surrogacy, and 18 states introduced or carried 
forward from 1987 31 bills to prohibit such contracts. /d. 
173. Pierce, An Analysis of Legislative Trends in Current State Surrogacy Proposals, ABA 
Section of Family Law, Aug. 1986, at 9 (unpublished report). 
174. See supra note 172. Professor James B. Boskey, a family law expert at Seton Hall 
Law School, is quoted as saying: "What we're seeing now is an emotional outburst 
of hasty legislation in response to perceived political pressures .... 'Ban it now!' 
That's quick and easy. Then, in a year or two, comes the next stage, a more sophis-
ticated, complex approach to regulate human behavior, where appropriate, because 
laws can't forbid it, as we've seen with drugs, Prohibition, and abortions." N.Y. 
Times, June 26, 1988, at A1, col. 6. 
175. Bill Introductions Report, supra note 172, at 1-3. 
176. Under Florida law, surrogate arrangements are defined as "pre-planned adoption 
arrangements," and the rights of the parties are decided according to the Florida 
adoption code. In Indiana, valid adoption agreements may only be made after the 
birth of the child. /d. at 2. 
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Four of the six states have imposed criminal sanctions for violations of 
the statutes, which range from prison terms of six months to five years, 
and fines up to $10,000. 177 
On February 5, 1988, two days after the New Jersey Supreme Court 
issued the Baby M decision, a bill was introduced in the Maryland Senate 
which would have banned surrogate parenthood arrangements absolutely 
and imposed criminal sanctions upon violators. 178 The bill was adopted 
by the Senate with floor amendments, but was subsequently defeated in 
the House Judiciary Committee. Later that month a similar bill was pro-
posed to the House of Delegates. 179 This bill provided that surrogate 
mother agreements were void if they required the exchange of considera-
tion, and once again held violators subject to criminal sanctions. 180 The 
bill exempted sisters and sisters-in-law from the prohibition so long as 
they received only reasonable compensation for medical, prenatal and 
birth expenses. 181 This bill received unfavorable reports and was de-
feated by a vote of 16-5 in the House Judiciary Committee. 182 
The defeat of bills similar to those introduced in the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly may be an implicit recognition by legislators of several 
problems inherent in prohibiting surrogate arrangements. First, a ban on 
surrogate arrangements may result in surrogate mothering moving un-
177. /d. Michigan law provides for a fine of up to $50,000 for persons acting as surrogate 
brokers. /d. 
178. S.B. No. 795, 1987 Md. Leg. Sess. This bill read as follows: 
For the purpose of prohibiting a person from being a party to an agree-
ment in which a woman agrees to conceive a child under certain condi-
tions and agrees to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights; providing a 
penalty; and generally relating to surrogate mothering agreements. 
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, that 
the Laws of Maryland read as follows: 
Article - Family Law 
5-207 
(A) A person may not be a party to an agreement in which a woman 
agrees to conceive a child (through artificial insemination] and agrees to 
voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. 
(B) A person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $10,000, 
or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year, or both. 
Brackets [ ] indicate matter deleted when original bill was amended after passage by 
the Senate. 
179. H.B. No. 1479, 1987 Md. Leg. Sess. (introduced by Delegate Kreamer). 
180. /d. 
181. /d. 
182. House Judiciary Committee vote tally sheet for H.B. No. 1479, March 18, 1988. A 
proposal similar to the previous bills was defeated in 1989 in the Maryland House of 
Delegates. H.B. No. 1340, 1989 Md. Leg. Sess. (introduced by Delegate Kreamer). 
This proposal called for a ban on most surrogate arrangements and imposed crimi-
nal sanctions on violators. /d. Two other bills involving surrogate arrangements 
were also introduced in the 1989 Maryland Legislative Session, but neither bill 
passed. S.B. No. 477, 1989 Md. Leg. Sess. (introduced by Senator Stone); S.B. No. 
526, 1989 Md. Leg. Sess. (introduced by Senators Hoffman and Hollinger). 
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derground. 183 Second, the validity of a ban on surrogate arrangements 
may be challenged on constitutional grounds. 184 Finally, surrogacy pro-
hibition forecloses a solution to the problem of infertility which appears 
to have worked out to the satisfaction of the parties in a number of surro-
gate arrangements. Iss 
B. Regulation Short of Prohibition 
Numerous states have considered bills proposing to subject surro-
gate arrangements to regulation, but few regulatory schemes have been 
enacted. 186 In Maryland, the 1988 session of the General Assembly con-
sidered House Bill 649, 187 which addressed the issue by proposing 
amendments to the Family Law, Estates and Trusts and Health-General 
articles of the Maryland Annotated Code. The bill would have estab-
lished minimum protections for the parties involved in surrogate agree-
ments and required that certain terms be included in an enforceable 
contract. 188 Like the proposals to prohibit surrogacy altogether, how-
ever, House Bill 649 was defeated in the House Judiciary Committee. 189 
House Bill 649 provided important protections for the interests of 
the child, the natural father and his wife, and the surrogate mother. 190 
Nevertheless, it did not adequately address questions concerning baby-
183. Harriet Blankfield, Director of Infertility Associates, International of Chevy Chase, 
Maryland, who has arranged over 50 surrogate births, has observed: "We screen out 
95 of every 100 applicants. But if you believe there are abuses now, wait till it goes 
underground. How many couples desperate for a biologically related baby will be 
so careful medically and psychologically? None. They'll take the first woman who 
seems committed to them." N.Y. Times, June 26, 1988, at A1, col. 6. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 151-170. 
185. See A Surrogate's Story, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 53; N.Y. Times, June 26, 1988, at 
Al, col. 6. 
186. See supra note 172. 
187. H.B. No. 649, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess. The bill was introduced by Delegate Tyras S. 
Athey and referred to the House Judiciary Committee on January 29, 1988. 
188. See infra note 190. 
189. By a vote of 19-2 the House Judiciary Committee voted against recommending the 
bill to the full House. House Judiciary Committee Tally Sheet for H.B. 649 (Mar. 
18, 1988). . 
190. Foremost among the protections for the child were provisions requiring the surro-
gate and natural father to share parental rights and duties from the moment of 
conception and shifting these rights and duties to the natural father and his wife 
from the time of birth, regardless of the child's condition. H.B. No. 649, 1988 Md. 
Leg. Sess. (amendtng MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§§ 5-311 (Supp. 1988). The bill 
also established the child,'s legitimacy and right to inherit; · Id. (amending Mo. 
FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§§ 5-311, 5-313 and 5-1028 (Supp. 1988) and MD. EsT. & 
TRUSTS CODE ANN .. § 1-206 (1974)). · 
Protections for the natural father ahd his wife included provisions guaranteeing 
them the right to review the results of medical,. genetic, and psychological screening 
of the surrogate before entering into a binding agreement with her. I d. (amending 
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-316 (1984)). 
The most important protection for the surrogate was a provision that her con-
sent to adoption would not be effective until the birth of the child. Id. (amending 
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 5-312 (Supp. 1988)). Furthermore, in the event the 
surrogate's consent was declared void, the surrogate would assume all parental 
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selling and the exploitation of needy women. 191 Despite its attempt to 
provide added protections for the child, the bill probably went too far in 
putting the state's stamp of approval on a controversial practice, the con-
sequences of which are relatively unknown. 
C The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act 
In August 1988, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws approved and recommended for enactment in all the 
states the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (The 
"Act"). 192 The drafters of the Act observe in their impassioned prefatory 
notes: 
This Conference is faced with the birth of many beautiful, inno-
cent children brought into the world through certain extraordi-
nary procedures which will ultimately require regulation, but 
meanwhile the status of these children demands our attention. 
These children are without traditional heritage, or parentage 
and other fundamentals, they are buffeted by forces beyond 
their comprehension and control. Although without guile or 
fault, but because of accident of birth, these children of the new 
biology have been deprived of certain basic rights. 193 
The drafting committee proceeded on the premise that its work was 
not to regulate surrogacy, but to clarify the status, rights, security, and 
well being of children born to surrogate mothers. 194 Recognizing that 
numerous surrogate arrangements already have been entered into and 
that the practice will continue, the committee strove to provide legisla-
tors with a clear statement of essential principles "without inordinate 
elaboration or detailed regulatory procedures." 195 The committee antici-
pated that the Act's sensitivity to the needs of the parties to surrogate 
arrangements, particularly to the needs of children, would make it ac-
rights and duties relating to the child. /d. (amending Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 
§ 5-314(C) (Supp. 1988). 
191. For example, it failed to guarantee the surrogate independent legal representation or 
an opportunity for counseling. 
192. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF AsSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988) (drafted by 
the National Conference of Commissioner on Uniform State Laws) [hereinafter 
UNIF. ASSISTED CONCEPTION AcT). "Assisted conception" is defined as "a preg-
nancy resulting from (i) fertilizing an egg of a woman with sperm of a man by 
means other than sexual intercourse or (ii) implanting an embryo, but the term does 
not include the pregnancy of a wife resulting from fertilizing her egg with sperm of 
her husband." /d. § 1(1). 
193. /d. Prefatory Note. 
194. /d. Prefatory Note. 
195. /d. Prefatory Note; see also id. § l comment (The Act was "not intended to establish 
a regulatory scheme establishing the appropriate methods for the performance of 
such assisted conception. A jurisdiction may, e.g., choose to enact separate regula-
tions requiring genetic screening when assisted conception is undertaken, requiring 
that assisted conception be conducted only under certain conditions, etc.") (empha-
sis in original). 
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ceptable to legislators and the public where other measures had failed. 196 
The committee noted that "there was great urgency ... to provide a 
child with two parents." 197 This is accomplished by the two fundamen-
tal provisions of the Act, which state that "a woman who gives birth to a 
child is the child's mother," 198 and that "the husband of a woman who 
bears a child through assisted conception is the father of the child ... 
unless ... it is determined that he did not consent to the assisted concep-
tion."199 The Act then creates two alternatives for legislatures to follow. 
Alternative A provides that if the parties have entered into an agreement 
which has been approved by the court prior to conception, the basic pre-
sumption of parentage is overridden, and upon the child's birth, the natu-
ral father and his wife are the child's parents.200 If the parties enter a 
surrogate agreement which has not been approved by the court prior to 
conception, however, the child's parents are the surrogate and the surro-
gate's husband, if he has consented to the assisted conception.201 
The approval process requires the court to appoint a guardian ad 
litem to represent the interests of the child who is to be conceived; the 
court may also appoint counsel to represent the surrogate.202 A hearing 
is then held on the petition of the parties to approve the contract. Ap-
proval may be granted only upon the satisfaction of ten criteria aimed at 
protecting the interests of the parties and the child. 203 · 
196. /d. Prefatory Note. 
197. /d. 
198. Id. § 2. 
199. /d. § 3. The husband has two years in which to commence an action to show that 
he did not consent to the assisted conception. Id. Sperm donors, however, are pre-
sumed not to be the parent of a child conceived through assisted conception unless 
there is a prior agreement. Id. Prefatory Note. 
200. /d. Alternative A, §§ 6, 8(a)(l). 
201. /d. Alternative A, § 5(b). Where the surrogate is unmarried at the time of concep-
tion or where her husband is not a party to the agreement, the parentage of the child 
is determined according to applicable state law. See id.; id. Alternative A, § 5 com-
ment; see also infra note 218. 
202. UNIF. ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT Alternative A, § 6(a). 
203. /d. Alternative A, § 6(b). This section requires a finding that: 
(1) the court has jurisdiction and all parties have submitted to its 
jurisdiction under subsection (e) and have agreed that the law of this State 
governs all matters arising under this [Act] and the agreement; 
(2) the intended mother is unable to bear a child or is unable to do so 
without unreasonable risk to an unborn child or to the physical or mental 
health of the intended mother or child, and the finding is supported by 
medical evidence; 
(3) the [relevant child-welfare agency] has made a home study of the 
intended parents and the surrogate and a copy of the report of the home 
study has been filed with the court; 
(4) the intended parents, the surrogate, and the surrogate's husband, 
if she is married, meet the standards of fitness applicable to adoptive par-
ents in this State; 
(5) all parties have voluntarily entered into the agreement and under-
stand its terms, nature, and meaning, and the effect of the proceeding; 
(6) the surrogate has had at least one pregnancy and delivery and 
bearing another child will not pose an unreasonable risk to the unborn 
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Any party may terminate the agreement at will prior to conception, 
and the court may do so for cause.204 Once conception has occurred, the 
surrogate may terminate the agreement by filing written notice with the 
court within 180 days after the last insemination pursuant to the agree-
ment.205 If the court finds that the surrogate is acting voluntarily and 
understands the consequences of the termination, it will vacate the order 
declaring the intended parents to be the parents of the child.206 The sur-
rogate has no liability to the intended parents for the termination. 207 
States reluctant to accept this carefully controlled approval of surro-
gate agreements may adopt Alternative B. This option provides that an 
agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate through as-
sisted conception is void. The effect of voiding the agreement is to estab-
lish the Act's basic presumption of parentage, that the surrogate is the 
mother and her husband, if she is married, is the father. 208 No sanctions 
are imposed upon any of the parties for entering into surrogate 
arrangements. 
If the Maryland General Assembly wishes to prohibit the practice of 
surrogacy altogether, Alternative B will effectively deter many surrogate 
contracts, since it would give parties advance notice that the state's 
courts are unavailable for enforcing the agreement. It would also clarify 
the legitimacy and paternity of the child by giving effect to the paternity 
presumption of the artificial insemination statutes.209 Finally, by declar-
ing surrogacy contracts void, it would eliminate the financial incentives 
for surrogate motherhood agencies to facilitate the arrangements. 
If the legislature is reluctant to foreclose entirely the option of surro-
gacy for responsible parties, Alternative A of the Act provides a means of 
making the procedure available without unduly offending public policy. 
The appointment of a guardian ad litem does much to ensure that the 
child or to the physical or mental health of the surrogate or the child, and 
this finding is supported by medical evidence; 
(7) all parties have received counseling concerning the effect of the 
surrogacy by [a qualified health-care professional or social worker] and a 
report containing conclusions about the capacity of the parties to enter 
into and fulfill the agreement has been filed with the court; 
(8) a report of the results of any medical or psychological examina-
tion or genetic screening agreed to by the parties or required by law has 
been filed with the court and made available to the parties; 
(9) adequate provision has been made for all reasonable health-care 
costs associated with the surrogacy until the child's birth including re-
sponsibility for those costs if the agreement is terminated pursuant to Sec-
tion 7; and 
(10) the agreement will not be substantially detrimental to the inter-
ests of any of the affected individuals. 
ld. Alternative A, § 6(b).(1)-(10) (bracketed material in original). 
204. /d. Alternative A, § 7(a). 
205. /d. Alternative A, § 7(b). 
206. ld. 
207. /d. Alternative A, § 7(c). 
208. ld. Alternative B .. 
209. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text. 
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baby's interests will be attended to before it is conceived.210 In addition, 
the fitness of not only the intended parents but also of the surrogate and 
her husband, who may in the end be recognized as the child's parents, 
would be evaluated by the same criteria as are applied by the state's 
adoption procedures.211 While Alternative A does not prohibit the pay-
ment of compensation to the surrogate or a placement agency, court ap-
proval of the surrogacy contract prior to conception should prevent the 
worst abuses of baby selling. 
Many of the procedures designed to protect the child will also pro-
tect the surrogate mother from exploitation. Section 6 of Alternative A 
requires the court to find that the surrogate entered into the agreement 
voluntarily and understands its terms and consequences, and also man-
dates that she receive counselling. 212 Additionally, the court has broad 
authority to ensure that any agreement entered into is not "substantially 
detrimental to the interests of any of the affected individuals."213 This 
authority would empower the court to determine both whether the com-
pensation proposed was adequate and whether the financial inducements 
constituted overreaching. Most important, the proposal provides an ex-
tended period during which the surrogate can change her mind and with-
draw from the agreement without penalty.214 
The sanctity of marriage and the traditional family is not unduly 
threatened by this proposal. The intended parents must be a married 
couple, and the intended child must be conceived through the use of the 
egg or sperm of one or both of them.215 Additionally, in the event the 
contract is terminated, the Act provides that the child has two parents; 
the surrogate and her husband if he has consented to the conception.216 
Alternative A preserves a reproductive option for couples whose child-
less marriages might otherwise be threatened, and it minimizes the possi-
bility of perceived abuses such as use of the surrogacy process by women 
who are able to bear a child themselves.217 
Alternative A also provides a framework for reconciling surrogate 
agreements with existing laws. The most important is the provision gov-
erning parentage under approved surrogacy agreements, which reestab-
lishes the paternity presumption of the artificial insemination statutes in 
210. For a more detailed discussion of the advantages of appointing a guardian ad litem, 
see Note, Representation for the Child, supra note 19, at 173-80. 
211. UNIF. ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT Alternative A, § 6(b)(4). 
212. /d. Alternative A, §§ 6(b)(5), 6(b)(7). 
213. /d. Alternative A, § 6(b)(10). 
214. /d. Alternative A, § 7. 
215. /d. § 1(3). 
216. /d. §§ 2-4; id. Alternative A, § 8. If the surrogate mother is unmarried at the time 
of conception or if her husband has not consented, upon termination of the surro-
gate contract the parentage of the child is determined according to applicable state 
law. /d. Alternative A, § 8(a)(2). 
217. See id. Alternative A, § 6(b )(2). Section 6(b )(2) requires medical evidence that the 
intended mother is unable to bear a child without unreasonable risk to herself or the 
child. /d. 
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the event that the surrogate terminates the agreement.218 The Act also 
resolves the privacy issues related to surrogacy by granting the surrogate 
a 180-day recantation period which coincides with the period during 
which she has a constitutionally protected right to terminate her 
pregnancy. 219 
The most controversial aspect of Alternative A undoubtedly will be 
the provision for the 180-day recantation period for the surrogate. The 
drafters of the legislation weighed the relative merits of a purely contrac-
tual treatment of surrogate agreements, which would have entitled the 
intended parents to the remedy of specific performance, against the appli-
cation of adoption consent principles, whereby the surrogate's consent 
would not be final until some time after the child's birth. The comment 
to section 7 states: 
[T]his recantation period can be explained by pointing out that 
the surrogacy arrangement is simply different from both the or-
dinary contract situation and the ordinary adoption decision 
and, therefore, ought to be treated differently. Surrogacy is not 
an ordinary contract because it contemplates the creation of a 
human being whose interests must be taken into account. It 
can be argued that the child's interests in a parent-child rela-
tionship with his or her biological mother are protected by giv-
ing her an extra 180 days to decide if she really wants to give up 
the child to the intended mother. 
On the other hand, surrogacy is different from an adoption 
and the post-birth consent requirement of adoption is not ap-
propriate to the surrogacy situation. . . . 
[T]he original decision to give up the child is made before 
the pregnancy by an adult woman who has already experienced 
a previous pregnancy. It is an arrangement which has been ex-
amined and approved by a court under Section 6, with all the 
218. /d. Alternative A, § 8. This section provides: 
(a) The following rules of parentage apply to surrogacy agreements 
approved under Section 6: 
(1) Upon birth of a child to the surrogate, the intended parents are 
the parents of the child and the surrogate and her husband, if she 
is married, are not parents of the child unless the court vacates 
the order pursuant to Section 7(b). 
(2) If, after notice of termination by the surrogate, the court vacates 
the order under Section 7(b) the surrogate is the mother of a re-
sulting child, and her husband, if a party to the agreement, is the 
father. If the surrogate's husband is not a party to the agreement 
or the surrogate is unmarried, paternity of the child is governed 
by (the Uniform Parentage Act]. 
ld. The comment to this section observes that under section 8(a)(2), the legally 
recognized father (the intended father) and the legally recognized mother (the sur-
rogate) could be part of two different households, but states: "This situation, while 
regrettable, is not unique in family law and may precipitate litigation over custody." 
ld. Alternative A, § 8 comment. 
219. /d. Alternative A, § 7(b); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
1988] Surrogate Arrangements in Maryland 143 
protections of the surrogate provided under that section. 220 
Under those circumstances, according to the drafters, some measure of 
recognition should be given to "the interests of the intended parents in 
the finality of the decision-making process before birth."22 1 
The drafters of the Act stress that Alternative A does not authorize 
surrogate contracts, it merely makes possible the authorization of such 
contracts by the courts.222 Some may object to burdening the courts 
with these determinations. It could be argued, however, that because the 
procedures for approving surrogate arrangements are similar to those for 
approving adoptions, the burden on the courts will be manageable. A 
case-by-case determination of the merits of a particular surrogate ar-
rangement is more likely to serve the interests of all involved than is a 
blanket authorization of surrogacy by the legislature. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The development of alternative birth technologies has broadened re-
productive options while sorely testing the limits of human law. The 
Baby M case exemplifies these limits by demonstrating how the best in-
terests of a child could be jeopardized by a surrogacy arrangement. Pub-
lic policy has for many years been concerned with preventing baby-
selling, protecting financially needy women from exploitation, preserving 
the sanctity of the family and protecting the right of privacy in decisions 
regarding childbearing. In Maryland, as in other states, these concerns 
are expressed by statutes governing adoption, custody, artificial insemi-
nation, legitimacy and paternity, and public records. These laws often 
conflict with the provisions of surrogate arrangements and call into ques-
tion their validity and enforceability. 
Agencies which provide assistance in arranging surrogate agree-
ments are already operating in Maryland. Legislation is needed to clarify 
the rights and duties of the parties to these arrangements. To date, the 
Maryland legislature has considered both a total ban on surrogate ar-
rangements with criminal sanctions for violators, and a fairly permissive 
regulatory statute. Neither alternative was acceptable, undoubtedly be-
cause neither adequately reflected public policy. The current legal vac-
uum, however, cannot be allowed to continue. The recently-drafted 
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act addresses the 
most important of these public policy concerns by means of two pro-
posed statutory schemes, one prohibiting surrogate arrangements, the 
other providing a specific procedure for court approval of each contract. 
The Maryland General Assembly should avail itself of the care and effort 
220. Id. Alternative A, § 7 comment (emphasis in original). 
221. ld. Alternative A, § 7(b) comment. 
222. ld. Alternative A, § 6 comment. 
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of the drafters of the model Act and consider enacting one of the pro-
posed alternatives. 
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